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H. ([2], [3]) up the for several aimed at 
out what precisely the existence axioms for proving 
theorems of mathematical practice’ in the of analysis 
algebra (cf. [4], [7], In [5] considered the question for 
in stability 
Friedman’s axioms formulated in language of artithmetic. 
This well suited classical analysis, concepts of are codable sets 
of numbers, while, the case algebra or theory one to 
restrict to countable structures and languages to make such a coding 
possible (this has been done in [4] and [5]). H owever, the distinction between the 
countable and the general (i.e., not necessarily countable) theory is not very 
fashionable nowadays, neither in algebra nor in parts of model theory because, 
except for a few uses of Zorn’s lemma in the latter, the two theories are 
developed along identical lines. 
The aim of this paper is to extend our work [5] by formulating set existence 
axioms in a general context that can accommodate model theory of arbitrary (not 
necessarily countable) languages and then examining which of these axioms are 
needed for several theorems in stability theory. Obviously, the interest of such an 
enterprise transcends stability theory as the axioms should be suitable, e.g., for 
general algebra as well. I should emphasize that, while dropping the assumption 
of countability, we do not assume the language to be uncountable. In fact, we 
carefully avoid any theorem (such as upward Lowenheim-Skolem) which makes 
explicit reference to cardinalities. This leaves us with a small portion of model 
theory which is, nevertheless, large enough to contain the basics of stability 
theory. 
The point of departure for building up the intended universe of our axioms is 
an abstract infinite set whose elements will serve as symbols of a logical language. 
We call these elements ‘letters’ and denote their set by ‘Lt’. Next we consider the 
set Lt* of words over Lt (i.e., finite sequences of elements of Lt) with the 
operation of concatenation C. While Friedman’s axioms describe properties of 
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natural numbers with the arithmetical operations and of sets of natural numbers, 
ours refer to words with the operation of concatenation and to sets of words. 
Friedman had five axiom systems ordered linearly by deductive strength, the 
weakest three (denoted ‘RC&, ‘WKL,,’ and ‘ACA,,‘) being the relevant ones for 
stability theory (cf. [5]). We thought to define analogues RCA,*, WKL,* and 
AC% and be content with these, but were soon forced to consider a larger list of 
axioms no more linearly ordered. The reason for this difference is that the 
wellordering of the natural numbers implies several forms of the axiom of choice 
while, in the absence of such an ordering of Lt*, we have to consider these forms 
as distinct and often incomparable axioms. 
Some of our findings are as follows. The theorem on definability of types and 
the finite equivalence theorem are derivable in RCA,* by the same proofs as those 
for the countable case in [5]. A modification of the proof in [5] shows that the 
symmetry lemma is also derivable in RCA,*. The theorems asserting the existence 
of defining schemes for types and of nonforking extensions turn out to be 
equivalent to distinct set existence principles (while both were equivalent to 
AC& in the countable case); the proofs of these facts are new as the arguments 
in [5, Theorems 3.7 and 4.81 do not generalize. Although the above list contains 
the most important of the theorems in stability theory considered in [5], the 
picture we obtain is far from complete. We leave several questions open, some 
metamathematical and others concerning the strength of theorems in stability 
theory (the most tantalizing is the one concerning the statement hat if all types 
are definable, then the theory is stable). These questions make it seem doubtful 
that we came up with all set existence principles that are relevant to stability 
theory, not to speak about general algebra. 
The paper depends, of course, on [5] especially for the proofs which go over 
unchanged. 
In Section 1 we describe the system RCA,* and its consequences. Section 2 
describes various distinct principles which in the countable case were all provable 
in RC&. Section 3 is about WKL,* and Section 4 about ACA,* and related 
systems. Section 5 contains open problems. 
1. The theory RCA: 
We use a two-sorted language with variables of the first sort U, u, w, 1, . . . 
ranging over words (i.e., elements of Lt*) and of the second sort X, Y, . . . 
ranging over sets of words. The language has a constant A (for the empty word), 
a binary function symbol C (for concatenation of words; we will simply write ‘UU’ 
for ‘C(U, v)‘), a unary predicate Lt, binary predicates = (for identity of words) 
and c (U c v meaning that u is a segment of V, cf. axiom (6) below) as well as E 
relating words to sets. A formula whose bound variables are all of the first sort will 
be called arithmetical; quantifiers of the form ‘3~ c t’ and ‘Vu c t’ are called 
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bounded and we define 2;, II;, A; for i = 0, 1 and j E o as is customarily done in 
arithmetic. 
The system RCA,* has seven axioms and three axiom schemata. The axioms 




(4) U(VW) = (UV)W. 
(5) Lt(l) A Lt(m) Aul=vm--fl=m. 
(6) ucv++3w,t(v=wut). 
(7) (Induction axiom) 
(Let us remark that if we interpret X in (7) as a truly second-order variable, i.e., 
ranging over all sets of words then, once the set Lt is given, (l)-(7) characterize 
the system (Lt*, A, Lt, C, c) up to isomorphism.) 
In order to be able to use induction we must stipulate existence of sets. We 
add: 
(8) A’$CA: Vu (q(u) t, q(u))+ 3XVu (u E Xt, q(u)) 
whenever 9 is 27 and I/J is a. 
Remark. In arithmetic (which is Friedman’s context) there is a good reason for 
starting by restricting at first comprehension to A$sets, namely, the fact that 
these are precisely the recursive (i.e., the ‘palpable’ kind of) sets. Our situation is 
more general and we may ask why we should start with the same restriction of the 
comprehension principle. The formal analogy to RCA,, is a reason good enough 
for doing so, especially since, as it turns out, the resulting RCG is equiconsistent 
with RCA0 (hence, with primitive recursive arithmetic). As an additional reason, 
we can point to the following ‘palpability’ feature characterizing the A:-definable 
sets. If X is a such, then for each u there is a concrete direct evidence that u E X or 
u 4 X, whichever is the case. Such an evidence is embodied by any v E Lt* which 
makes either qi(u, v) or lr#i(u, v) true, where q(u) = 3v ~7i(u, v) and q(u) = 
Vu r$i(u, v). In arithmetic, this feature implies the existence of an algorithm for 
finding such an evidence. In our context, however, we cannot conclude the same, 
as we lack the ability of searching through Lt* systematically. 
As in the case of RC&, we need more induction than (7) and (8) are able to 
provide. 
(9) Zy-induction: [v(A) A Vu, 1 (q(u) A Lt(l)-, ~(ul))]+Vu q(u) 
whenever q is 2:. 
Finally: 
(10) Lt is infinite. 
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This completes the description of RCA,*. Quine [6] remarked that once we 
have at least two distinct letters, we can encode finite sequences of words as 
single words using the operation of concatenation alone. Having this in mind, it is 
easy to see that RCA,, is interpretable in RCA,* by identifying the set o of natural 
numbers with the set {a}* of the words based on a given letter a E Lt; notice that 
{a}* is definable from a by a A$formula. Conversely (as finite sequences of 
natural numbers are encodable in arithmetic as single numbers), RCA,* is 
interpretable in RCA, by identifying Lt with the set of numbers encoding 
sequences of length one. Notice that the interpretation of RCA, in RCA,* is 
conservative while the converse interpretation is not. 
We can define, in an obvious way, the notion of primitive recursive function 
over Lt* the main clause being that whenever g and h are primitive recursive, so 
is f provided that: 
and 
f(u1, . . . , %, 4 =g(u1, . . . 9 %I) 
1 E Lt-f (ul, . . . , u,, vl) = h(ul, . . . , u,, v, I, f (u,, . . . , u,, v)). 
A useful example of such is the length function Ih(A) = A, lh(ul) = lh(u)a from 
Lt* into w (i.e., {a}*). All primitive recursive functions are representable in 
RCA,*. It follows that if ‘?I kRCA,* and {a}: is isomorphic to the standard 
integers for one a E Lt,, it is so for all u e Lt a; if such is the case, we call ‘?I an 
w-model. RCG has w-models of arbitrary cardinality. 
Two other primitive recursive functions of interest are defined as follows: 
pd(A) = A, pd(ul) = u and u z A = u, u - vl = pd(u - v). 
Using A, we can prove as in [4, 1.11: 
Lemma 1.1 (RCA,*). fl-induction holds us well. 
First-order logic over a (not necessarily countable) language L can be 
developed in RCA,* in a natural way because the formulas of the language are, in 
fact, words over a sufficiently large set of letters. The notions of formula, logical 
axiom, proof will have A: descriptions. Theories will be sets of words. An 
L-structure M = ([MI, S”)ScL can be represented as a pair of sets ([Ml, X”) 
where XM = {(S, u) : u E S”}. As in [5], we will also (and mostly) speak of the 
model M, i.e., the complete diagram of the structure (M, u)~~,~,; this is a set of 
L(IMI)-sentences where L((MI) is L augmented by individual constants which 
name the elements a E [MI. We make no notational distinction between an 
element and its name. A word of caution: among the symbols of L we have the 
equality = ; the corresponding relation = M is not necessarily the identity relation 
on [MI, but this should not disturb us (by the way, in RCA0 where every set is 
well ordered, we could assume w.1.o.g. that the interpretation of the equality 
symbol was always the identity). 
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As described in [5], key notions like consistent, complete or stable theory, as 
well as type, nonforking extension, etc. will all have arithmetical definitions of 
low complexity. The following basic theorems of stability theory are provable in 
RCA,*: the local definability theorem (stating that for a stable T, every type p over 
a subset of a model of T is definable), the finite equivalence relation theorem and 
the symmetry lemma. The proofs of the first two of these theorems are like those 
in [5] for the countable case. For the symmetry lemma, however, we have to 
come up with a modified proof: 
Theorem 1.2 (Symmetry Lemma) (RCA*). Let T be stable and A U {b, c} a 
subset of one of its models. Zf t(b, A U {c}) does not fork over A, then 
t(c, A U {b}) does not fork over A. 
Proof. We are given that pi(x) = t(b, A U {c}) is a nonforking extension of 
p(x) = t(b, A) and want to show that ql(y) = t(c, A U {b}) is a nonforking 
extension of q(y) = t(c, A) ( as in [5], we ask the reader to keep in mind the 
notational distinction between the type-variables). To this end, assume that 
kq(b, c), i.e., q(b, y) E ql; we have to show that q needs the formula q(x, y). 
Recall that a q-ladder of length k is a pair of sequences (ao, . . . , ak_l) and 
(b,, . . . , bk-1) such that kq(ai, bj) iff i ~j. In a stable theory there are no 
arbitrarily long q-ladders. 
Let &(x, x1, . . . ,x&l, y, y,, . . . , y&_l) be the formula stating that 
(x, . . . , Xk-I) and (Y, * . . , Y&_l) are q-ladders. As b and c are q-ladders of 
length 1, the type pi(x) needs ql(x, y), trivially. By the definition of nonforking, 
p(x) needs q1 as well. Let k be the largest integer such that p(x) needs vk. 
Assume this happens via 6(ii, V), i.e. (cf. Definition 4.1 in [5]), 
where iii, Di are subsequences of ii, V of lengths k - 1, k respectively. Let 
iii = (Uii, . * . j ~i.k-1) and fii = (Vi09 . . . , Vi.k-_l). Consider the formula 
J”(kQ, . . . 9 u/-1,0, 6, fi) = h(fi, fi) A 1$1 (32 qk(z, fii, vi)* $k(uiO, fiit vi)). 
Obviously, A is consistent, i.e. Mu, * . * ~3 A. We claim that: 
WU~. . . ut-I,Ofiu (A+ ,1(, jyk V(%jr c)) 7 
showing that q(y) needs ~(x, y) via A. Proof of the claim: Otherwise, 
and as we know also that 
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we infer, with the definition of A in mind, that 
This means that p1 needs &+i. But then, p needs I+!J~+~ as well, contradicting the 
maximality of k. 
Let us remark that this proof is completely elementary in the sense that it does 
not involve at all constructions of infinite objects, not even recursive ones. This 
stands in contrast with the proof of the symmetry lemma in [5]. That proof is not 
formalizable in RCA,* because it uses a theorem, 4.5 of [5], which is derivable in 
RCA, but not in RCA,* (we discuss the derivability of this theorem in our general 
context, in the second problem of Section 5). This is by no means an isolated 
phenomenon. A much more important example is the following. In RCA0 we 
could prove that every complete theory has a model but we cannot do the same in 
RCG. the reason for this difference is explained next. 
2. VWKL$ and related systems 
Consider the following set existence principles: 
VWKL (Very Weak Kiinig Lemma): “Every infinite tree FIC<~ 2 with no 
terminal nodes has a branch”. 
OP (Ordering Principle) : “Every set can be linearly ordered”. 
AC (Axiom of Choice): “If I and R are sets such that for all i E Z, Ri = 
{u : (i, u) E R} # 0, then th ere is a function F c R with dom F = I”. 
WOP (Wellordering Principle): “Every set can be wellordered”. 
All of these principles are provable in RCA0 (due to the fact that every set is 
wellordered with order type 0). VWKL is the principle needed for constructing a 
model of a countable complete theory. 
Neither of the last three principles mentioned above is provable in RCA,*. 
VWKL is still provable (recall that in this system, w = {a}*) but is insufficient for 
building a model of an arbitrary complete theory. What we need is the following: 
Ext VWKL (Extended Very Weak Kiinig Lemma): “Let X be a set and 9 a family 
of functions from finite subsets of X into (0, 1) such that: (a) the restriction of 
any function in 9 to a subset of its domain belongs to 9; (b) if f E 9 and u E X, 
then f has an extension g E 9 with u E domg. Under these conditions, there is a 
function F :X+ (0, l} such that F 1 X0 E 9 for all finite X0 c X”. 
This principle is not provable in RCA,*. As a matter of fact we have: 
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Theorem 2.1. Ext VWKL is not provable in RCA,* together with the full 
(second-order) comprehension axiom CA. 
Proof (a rudimentary Fraenkel-type argument). Let X be an infinite set and E an 
equivalence relation on X all of whose classes have precisely two elements. Let 9’ 
be the family of subsets of X*, second-order definable with (first-order) 
parameters in the structure (X*; C, E) (where C is the concatenation on X*). 
Then (21= (X*; 9; A, C, c; E) is a model of RCA,* with full comprehension but 
not of Ext VWKL. A counterexample to the latter is provided by the set 9 of 
those functions f from finite subsets of X to (0, l} satisfying that f(a) Zf (b) 
whenever a, b E dom f and a E b. 
Let us remark that a similar argument shows that Ext VWKL does not follow 
even from RCA,* + CA + OP. On the other hand, RCA,* + Ext VWKL implies 
OP. Also, the independence of AC from the Prime Ideal Theorem shows that AC 
does not follow from RCA,* + CA + Ext VWKL. We conjecture that RCA,* + 
WOP (or even ACA* + WOP, with ACti defined as in Section 4) does not 
imply Ext VWKL. 
We now set VWKL,* = RCA,* + Ext VWKL. Let MECT be the statement hat 
every complete theory has a model. 
Theorem 2.2 (RCA,*). MECT is equivalent to VWKL,*. 
Proof (Sketch). To show that VWKL,* implies MECT we proceed as in the 
countable case with a slight complication due to the fact that we cannot use “the 
first constant not mentioned so far” (see 5.1 below for similar complication). For 
the reverse implication let P,, u E X be unary predicates; denote 
q(x) = /j {P&u) : u E dom f, f(u) = 0} U {lP&) : u E dom f, f(u) = l} 
and let T be the theory whose axioms insure that {x: Pf(x)} is non-empty iff 
f E 9. T is complete, and if M b T, then any a E IA41 picks up an F as desired. 
3. WKL; 
The extended weak Konig lemma is: 
Ext WKL: “If X and 9 satisfy condition (a) of Ext VWKL as well as: (c) for 
every finite X,, c X there is an f E 9 with domf =X,,, then there is an 
F :X-, (0, l} such that F / X,, E 9 for all finite X0 c x”. 
This principle was formulated by Rado and later by Engeler and Robinson 
(cf. [l]). We let WKL,* be RCA,* + Ext WKL. 
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Theorem 3.1 (RCA,*). (a) WKG ’ IS equivalent to the completeness theorem. 
(b) WKG is equivalent to the compactness theorem. 
The proof is similar to its unstarred counterpart and to 2.1. 
4. AC&* 
We now consider the arithmetic comprehension axiom-scheme: 
_%CA: 3XVu (U l Xwq(u)) 
whenever q is an arithmetic formula. 
Proposition 4.1 (RCA,*). (a) z’O,-CA is equivalent to x:-CA (i.e., like J&CA 
but Q, restricted to J$-formulas). 
(b) J%CA is equivalent to the following axiom: if F : I+ Lt* is a function, then 
there is an X s. t. Vu (u E Xtt 3 E Z (F(i) = u)) (i.e., “if F is a function, then its 
range exists”). 
Proof. (a) Like 2.7 in [7]. 
(b) Let q(u) = 3v ~+!J(u, v) with $J At. Then Z = {(u, v): I/J(U, v)} exists by 
A:-CA and so does F = {((u, v), u): (u, v) E Z}. F is a function whose range is 
x = {u : q(u)}. 
We let ACA,* be VWKG + zO,-CA. With this definition we have: 
Proposition 4.2. ACA,* implies WKL,*. 
Proof. If 9 satisfies the hypothesis (a) and (c) of Ext WKL, then its subset 
9’ = {f : for all finite X0 c X 3g E 9 (f c g A X0 c dom g)} exists by zz-CA, is 
nonempty and satisfies conditions (a) and (b) of Ext VWKL. 
We now turn to the global definability and extension theorems. If p E S(A) and 
q(x, J) is an L-formula, then we say that (a(~, Z), p(J, 2)) is a quasi q-definition 
for p if n(x, 6) EP for some 6 E A and for any such 6, /3(jj, 6) is a q-definition for 
p (i.e., for all d E A, cp(x, a) EP iff bj3[d, 61). The sharp version of the local 
definability theorem which is provable in RCG, says that for a stable T, if 
p E S(A), then p has a quasi q-definition for all q. A function d is called a (quasi) 
defining scheme for p E S(A) if for all ~(x, J), d(q) is a (quasi) q-definition for 
p. Consider the following: 
GDT (Global Definability Theorem). “If T is stable, p E S(A), then p has a 
defining scheme”. 
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GQDT (Global Quasi Definability Theorem). “If T is stable, p E S(A), then p 
has a quasi defining scheme”. 
ET (Extension theorem). “If T is stable, p E S(A) and A c B, then p has a 
nonforking extension q E S(B)“. 
In the countable case these theorems were equivalent. In general, the situation 
is as follows: 
Proposition 4.3. (a) GDT is provable in RCA,* + ZZ-CA + AC. 
(b) GQDT is provable in RCA,* + z’O,-CA. 
(c) ET is provable in ACA,*. 
Proof. As in [5, Theorems 3.6 and 4.71 (for the proof of (b) we should keep in 
mind that for any q and p, p has a quasi q-definition (cu, /3) such that all 
extralogical symbols occurring in (Y and /3 occur in Q, as well; this fact is provable 
in RCG). 
Proposition 4.4 (RCG). Each of GDT, GQDT and ET implies _Xz-CA. 
Proof. Let F be a function with domain 1. We want to prove that the range of F 
exists. The argument in [5, Theorems 3.7 and 4.81 relied on countability in an 
essential way, so we have to come up with a new proof. 
We define a theory T in the language L containing a binary predicate E, for 
each u E Lt* and a unary predicate 8 for each i E I. The axioms of T insure that: 
(1) Each E, is an equivalence relation with infinitely many classes, all infinite. 
(2) The relations E, are independent in the sense that whenever ul, . . . , uk 
are distinct and Yi, . . . , Yk are equivalence classes of E,,, . . . , E,,,, then the 
intersection Yi n - - ’ n Yk is infinite. 
(3) If F(i) = u, then & is an equivalence class of E,. 
(4) If F(i) = F(j), then 4 = 4. 
It is easy to verify that T has quantifier elimination and is complete. 
Next, we build a model M of T. The elements of [MI will be pairs (.Z, f) where .Z 
is a finite subsets of Z, f a finite function with range f c o - (0, l} such that 
domf rl F(J) = 0 (where F(J) = {F( i : i E J}). Intuitively, c = (.Z, f) is meant to ) 
belong to those and only those P;: for which F(i) E F(J) while f indicates to which 
class of E, c belongs for u E domf. Formally, for c = (.Z, f) define a function 
g,:Lt*-+ o by: 
i 
0 if u E F(J), 
gC(u) = f(u) if u E domf, 
1 otherwise. 
Let c E Z’y iff g,(F(i)) = 0, M k c = c’ iff g, = g,, (i.e., F(J) = F(J’) and f =f’) 
and c Ef c’ iff gJu> = g=,(u). 
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Keeping in mind that T has quantifier elimination, one sees that we have, 
indeed, constructed a model M k T. Define p E S(M) as the unique type 
containing 
{e(x) : i E Z} U (1.x E, c : c E IMI and g=(u) # O}. 
p can be shown to exist, in RCA,*. It is easily seen that for all c E IMI, x # c E p 
and x E, c EP iff ~Ju) = 0. The important property of p follows: 
uerangeF iff xE,c~pforsomec~IMl. 
We can now conclude the proof: 
To see that GDT implies EZ-CA notice that if d is a defining scheme, then, 
letting qU(x, y) = x E, y, we have: 
u~rangeF iff Mt=gyd(rp,)(y). 
If d is a quasi defining scheme, then we have: 
u E range F iff 31? E (MI 3a, /3 [d(q,) = (a, p) A cy(x, E) EP A M k 3y p(y, I?)] 
iff VE E IMI Va, /3 [d(cp,) = (a, p) A (u(x, 2) EP- M k 3y /3(y, I?)]; 
thus, range F exists by A:-CA, showing that GQDT implies J?,-CA. Finally, to 
show that ET implies 2’O,-CA, let c be an element realizing p and q E S(M U {c}) 
a nonforking extension of p. Then we have: u E range F iff x E, c E q. 
The proof is complete. 
Proposition 4.5 (RCA,*). GDT implies AC. 
Proof. Assume that Ri = {u : (i, u) E R} # 0 for all i E I. We want to show that 
there is a function F c R with dom F = I. Let T be the complete stable theory of 
independent equivalence relations Ei, i E I, each having infinitely many equiv- 
alence classes. T has elimination of quantifiers. Let M L T be defined as follows. 
The elements of M are all finite functions f with domf c Z and such that for all 
i E domf, f(i) E Ri U (W - (0)) ( we assume, w.1.o.g.) that Ri II w = 0 for all i E I). 
For such f, define f’ 3f with domf’ = Z by letting f’(i) = 0 for all i 4 domf. Let 
fE”g iff f’(i), g’(i) E Ri or else f’(i) = g’(i). Let p E S(M) be the unique type 
containing {x Eif :f’(i) E Ri} U {lx Ei f : f ‘(i) $ Ri}. Assuming GDT, p has a 
defining scheme d. If cp,(x, y) = x Ei y, then d(qi) must contain at least one f with 
f(i) E Ri (this is easily seen if we keep in mind that, due to the quantifier 
elimination, d(~i) is equivalent to a quantifier free formula). Define F(i) = f (i) 
where f is the leftmost such f occurring in d(~i). F is the desired function. 
Summing up, we have the following. 
Theorem 4.6. (a) (RCA,*) GDT is equivalent to 2:-CA + AC. 
(b) (RCA,*) GQDT is equivalent to %-CA. 
(c) (WKG) ET is equivalent to ACA,*. 
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5. Open problems 
First problem. Can we prove in RCA,*, that ET implies Ext VWKL? In other 
words, is ET equivalent to AC% over RCA,*? A positive answer to this question 
amounts to constructing in RCA,*, for any 9 satisfying (a) and (b), a stable 
theory T, a model it4 k T and a type p E S(0) such that any nonforking extension 
of p to S(M) would pickup a ‘branch’ F through 9. 
Second problem. In RCA,, we could prove the following weak extension 
theorem: 
WET: “If T is stable, p E S(0), then there is an M k T and a q E S(M) which is a 
nonforking extension of p”. 
(Cf. [5, Theorem 4.51.) It seems that WET is not provable in VWKL,*; the reason 
is as follows. 
Let VWKL+ be VWKL stated for a .Y which is a z&definable class rather than 
a set. VWKL+ is provable in RCAO. The extension Ext VWKL+ which is 
Ext VWKL formulated for any z&definable class 9 is certainly not provable in 
RCA,*. We conjecture that Ext VWKL+ is not provable in VWKG. Using the 
method of proof of 4.5 in [5] we can show that WET is provable in 
RCA,* + Ext VWKL+. Our second problem is the following: 
Is WET equivalent to Ext VWKL+ over RCA,*? 
A positive answer amounts to constructing, for any $‘-class 9 satisfying (a) 
and (b), a stable theory T and a type p E S(0) such that for any M k T and 
q E S(M), if q is a nonforking extension of p, then it picks up a ‘branch’ F 
through 9. 
Thiid problem. Our last problem concerns the relationship between definability 
of types and stablity. Generalizing 3.3 of [5], we can show: 
Proposition 5.1 (WKL,*). Zff or all M k T and p E S(M), p is definable, then T is 
stable. 
Sketch of the Proof. We indicate how to handle the part of the argument in [5] 
which used countability. The method is routine, but somewhat tedious. 
Assume that q(j, 7) is an unstable formula with f, J of lengths k, m. We want 
to conclude that there is an M k T and a p E Sk(m) with p not definable. We start 
by defining a set of new constants C as follows (a, bO, . . . , b,_I being hxed 
distinct words): 
co=o, 
C n+l = C, U {{a, 3x q(x)) : 3x v(x) a sentence of L(Q) 
U { ( bi, B(y)) : 19(j) an L(C,J formula, i < m}, 
C=U{C,:n<o}. 
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The intended meaning of these constants will be made clear in a moment. 
Letting (6, 19) denote the sequence ((b,, 8(J)), . . . , (b,_*, O(J))), consider 
the following set of sentences: r = T U r, U r,, where 
r, = (3x ~/J(X)+ $~((a, 3x q)):3x 111 an L(C)-sentence} and 
G= 3~,/J(q(% (6, ej>>+ ej((6, ej)):l i E Oj, ej(y) an L(C)-formula forj < 1 . I 
We claim that r is finitely consistent and we postpone for the moment the 
proof. Using compactness, hence WKI$, we conclude that there is a model 
N b lY The truth of r, insures that if M is the set of elements of N denoted by 
C-constants, then M <N, hence M k T and M k r,; this second fact insures that 
the set of formulas 
{&j, (6, e)) + e((6, e)): e(y) an L(C)-formula) 
is finitely satisfiable in M, hence, using compactness again, it can be extended to a 
type p E S,(M). p has no q-definition (as for every e(y), (6, 0) witnesses that 8 
is not a q-definition of p). From this point on, one proceeds like in [5]. 
We still have to prove the claim that Tis finitely consistent. Notice that the set 
of constants C is primitive recursive and so is the partial order s over it defined 
by c G c’ iff c = c’ or c occurs in c’ (in the obvious sense). Let r’ c r be finite and 
let C’=CAUC;U... U CL-, be the set of constants in I” such that each Cl has 
either the form {(a, 3x q)} or {(b,, t9), . . . , (b,_l, t9)}. We may further 
assume that C’ is closed downwards with respect to G and that d’ G d” whenever 
d’ E Ci, d” E Cj and i <j. Now use the instability of Q, and take a model M k T and 
a q-tree {QJ(~, &) :s E <n 2) with dS E M. One can show by ,$-induction on i s n 
that there is a function & : Ch U . . . U Cf_ 1+ M that provides an interpretation 
under which I” rl L(Ct, U . . . U Cl_l) is made true. To do this, we use a stronger 
induction assumption, which implies, among others, that fi: maps the C,% that are 
of the form (6, 0) to sequences & which are parameters of an initial segment of a 
branch in our q-tree. We skip any further details. 
The third problem we leave open is the following: 
Is the statement of 5.1 equivalent to WKI_$? 
A positive answer amount to producing, for any 9 satisfying conditions (a) of 
Ext VWKL and (c) of Ext WKL, an unstable complete theory T such that for all 
M k T and nondefinable p E S(M), M and p pick up a ‘branch’ F of 9. 
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